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INTRODUCTION 
Our topic is the “bounds on executive discretion.” A number of the 
articles assume, implicitly or explicitly, that there are two principal bounds: 
law and politics. Yet another subset of the articles—a partly overlapping 
subset—illustrates, implicitly or explicitly, that there is also a distinct third 
bound on executive discretion: conventions, roughly understood as unwritten 
but obligatory rules of the political game.1 
I will argue that conventions pervasively shape and constrain executive 
discretion and are an indispensable tool for understanding the issues 
discussed in the articles. Debates among legal academics over executive 
 
† John H. Watson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Prepared in conjunction with the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium on “The Bounds of Executive Discretion in the 
Regulatory State” on October 16-17, 2015. Thanks to Nick Bagley for helpful comments. 
1 For a more precise definition and analysis of conventions, see generally Adrian Vermeule, 
Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013). I will assume that analysis as 
background here. 
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discretion misfire if and when the role of conventions is overlooked or 
misunderstood. In particular, legal debates over executive discretion should 
take account of three distinctions: (1) between contingent politics and 
conventions; (2) between intragovernmental conventions and extragovernmental 
conventions; and (3) between conventions against doing things and 
conventions against saying things. The last distinction, in particular, 
illuminates the strong resistance, in contexts such as immigration, to 
executive policy statements that make explicit a pattern of enforcement 
discretion, one that would otherwise remain implicit. Even holding legal 
authority constant, making that authority explicit through general policy 
statements may trigger the normatively inflected political sanctions that are 
characteristic of conventions. 
I do not at all mean to claim that executive-constraining conventions are 
necessarily desirable from a welfarist standpoint—they may or may not be. 
Nor do I claim that they cannot be overridden or broken, or anything like 
that. Conventions have a dimension of weight, often have implicit override 
conditions, and may be more or less fragile. Indeed, part of the story is that 
as the political parties have become more polarized over time, a number of 
intragovernmental conventions resting on reciprocal cooperation have broken 
down, and the politics of executive action have become both more legalized 
and more political—in the ordinary convention-independent sense of 
“political.” But I will claim that the role of conventions cannot safely be 
neglected in any analysis of executive discretion. 
I. EXAMPLES 
Let me begin with some examples of conventions that shape and constrain 
executive discretion. There are also conventions that shape and constrain the 
behavior of other branches, and indeed the government as a whole, but I will 
focus strictly on executive-governing conventions in the United States 
constitutional order. In parliamentary systems lacking a formal and 
institutional separation of executive power from other powers, of course, the 
whole question of categorization would have to be approached differently. 
A. Removal 
I will begin with some examples of conventions surrounding the removal 
of executive officials. In the Free Enterprise Fund litigation, the Supreme Court 
and the lower courts treated the Commissioners of the Securities and 
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Exchange Commission as though they have for-cause tenure.2 Legally 
speaking, however, they simply do not. The relevant statutes say nothing about 
tenure, and thus fail to override the longstanding background default principle 
that for-cause tenure must be express.3 There is a limited exception in which 
the Court has been willing to imply for-cause tenure for administrative officers 
who are in essence mini-judges exercising purely adjudicative functions,4 but 
the SEC does not fit that description. The independence of the Commissioners, 
in the sense of for-cause tenure, is not based on a statute but on unwritten rules 
with normative force. As one lower court put it, it is just “commonly understood” 
that the Commissioners are independent. 5 
Somewhat similarly, there is a powerful convention that Presidents cannot 
fire the Chair of the Federal Reserve except for serious cause.6 Here, too, there 
is no legal rule to that effect, but it is a universally agreed-upon rule of the 
political game—agreed upon in a tacit sense.7 The most telling evidence is that 
when Presidents have attempted to maneuver a Fed Chair out of office, they 
have proceeded covertly and circumspectly, so as not to outrage public opinion.8 
In 2007, President George W. Bush failed to renew the terms of seven 
United States Attorneys, and public opinion rose up in outrage.9 Bush’s action 
was indisputably within his legal power; the relevant statutes do not grant 
United States Attorneys for-cause tenure, and indeed the Court ruled early 
and clearly that no such tenure exists.10 Yet a network of conventions that 
 
2 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). In his response 
to the symposium articles, Peter Strauss makes the odd remark that “(n)either can the proposition 
be considered a matter of ‘convention,’ as Professor Vermeule suggests, since Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion holds that the PCAOB’s considerable powers are valid”—as though conventions cannot be 
incorporated into judicial holdings. See Peter L. Strauss, Response, Things Left Unsaid, Questions Not 
Asked, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2016); infra Section II.A (discussing the adoption 
of conventions as law). 
3 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1175, 1195 (noting the convention regarding not firing SEC 
Commissioners despite the lack of statutory protections). 
4 See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (“We have not a removal for cause 
involving the rectitude of a member of an adjudicatory body, nor even a suspensory removal until 
the Senate could act upon it by confirming the appointment of a new Commissioner or otherwise 
dealing with the matter. Judging . . . the claim that the President could remove a member of an 
adjudicatory body like the War Claims Commission merely because he wanted his own appointees 
on such a Commission, we are compelled to conclude that no such power is given to the President 
directly by the Constitution, and none is impliedly conferred upon him by statute simply because 
Congress said nothing about it.”). 
5 SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988). 
6 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1176-78, 1196-99 (explaining this convention). 
7 See id. (discussing this convention in further detail). 
8 See id. at 1198-99 (reviewing Paul Volcker’s departure from the Federal Reserve). 
9 Id. at 1201. 
10 See id. (“U.S. Attorneys are appointed for four-year terms, and it is clear that as a strictly legal 
matter they serve at the pleasure of the President; Parsons [v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897),] itself 
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limited presidential control over U.S. Attorneys had grown.11 As described 
by Mary Jo White, herself a former U.S. Attorney, the President may replace 
the whole set en masse, at the time of a partisan change of administration, but 
may not engage in selective replacement during the middle of a presidential 
term.12 The rationale for the convention is rather obviously to protect the 
independence of U.S. Attorneys through a form of herd immunity or safety 
in numbers, preventing the President from singling out particular prosecutors 
based on their decisions.13 
B. Directive Power 
Now let me turn to conventions governing the so-called “directive 
authority,” raised by Coglianese and Firth in their article.14 Although the 
scope and limits of the directive power of the President are among the most 
contested issues in administrative law,15 the debates would be greatly 
improved by the recognition that conventions pervasively shape and constrain 
that power. The President’s legal powers of direction are substantially greater 
than his actual discretion to direct, and not only because “politics” is an 
additional constraint—unless we define politics, unhelpfully, to include conventions. 
I return to the definitional issues shortly, but let me offer some examples. 
There is a clear and powerful convention that restricts presidential 
direction of agency adjudication, especially in formal proceedings.16 What 
makes this convention particularly striking is that it governs even where the 
department head, herself subject to presidential direction, would otherwise 
 
involved a federal district attorney, and the Court held that a statutory term of years does not, as a matter 
of statutory interpretation, immunize the office-holder from at-will discharge by the President.”). 
11 See id. at 1201-02 (describing the conventions). 
12 See Julie Scelfo, Former U.S. Atty. Says Independence Threatened, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 14, 2007, 
8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/former-us-atty-says-independence-threatened-96115 [https://
perma.cc/KYY8-ASDC] (“Essentially, all U.S. attorneys, as political appointees, are expected to be 
replaced when the party changes. . . . It is an entirely different matter when replacement of the U.S. 
attorneys are [sic] made during the same administration. . . . [Replacement in the middle of a 
President’s term,] in my experience and to my knowledge, is quite unprecedented.”). 
13 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1203 (“The key distinction is between wholesale partisan 
replacement and retail replacement, a distinction that supporters of the convention justify as 
preventing Presidents or their underlings from pressuring prosecutors to bring particular, politically 
charged cases.”). 
14 Cary Coglianese & Kristin Firth, Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry into 
Norms About Executive Power, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1871 (2016). 
15 See id. at 1875-76 (“One side of this debate treats the President’s directive authority as 
virtually unconstrained, whether as a matter of constitutional law (the unitary executive theory) or 
as a matter of statutory presumption. . . . The other side of the debate holds that, even absent a 
specific statutory prohibition, presidential authority over administrators is constrained in that the 
President cannot make decisions that have been entrusted by Congress to administrators.”). 
16 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1211-14 (analyzing this convention). 
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have legal authority to intervene. As Elena Kagan put it, “The only mode of 
administrative action from which [President] Clinton shrank was 
adjudication. At no time in his tenure did he attempt publicly to exercise the 
powers that a department head possesses over an agency’s on-the-record 
determinations.”17 The convention, then, is definitely a constraint on the 
directive power of the President as President. 
Many executive-branch lawyers have spoken of unwritten conventions 
protecting the independence of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).18 In the 
most high-minded version of this account, OLC is supposed to give the 
President entirely independent legal advice and to act as an impartial legal 
arbiter in interagency jurisdictional disputes; the President would violate 
convention by directing OLC to give one opinion or another.19 There is good 
reason to think that the high-minded picture is partly aspirational, although 
there have been important cases in which OLC did actually contradict the 
President’s wishes.20 It is not that the conventions are unreal, but they have 
probably weakened over time, and were always subject to bending or breaking 
when political pressure became sufficiently great.21 
In a different example, Michael Livermore and Ricky Revesz discern a 
tradition of appointing relatively independent voices to the position of Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Administrator, and opine that 
the tradition would likely be difficult to break.22 The cash value of this 
tradition seems to be that the OIRA Administrator has leeway to make 
regulatory policy and to apply the cost–benefit framework of relevant 
executive orders, without fear or favor.23 Although Livermore and Revesz 
phrase the “tradition” in terms of appointment, it would seem, a fortiori, that 
replacing an OIRA Administrator on openly political grounds would 
probably be even more likely to provoke convention-based political sanctions. 
 
17 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2306 (2001) (emphasis added). 
18 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1209-11 (discussing the conventions pertaining to the OLC). 
19 See id. at 1209 (describing the supposed role of the OLC under this view). 
20 See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 
1457 n.36 (2010) (discussing impoundment of Congressional appropriations and the line-item veto, 
among other examples). 
21 See Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make 6-19, 37-39 (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
22 Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Can Executive Review Help Prevent Capture?, in 
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 
420, 421 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2014). 
23 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1205-06 (describing the role of the OIRA Administrator). 
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II. CONVENTIONS AS THE THIRD BOUND 
A. Neither Law Nor Politics 
Whatever the details, the relevant point for our purposes is that 
conventions are a tertium quid, neither law nor politics, at least not necessarily 
so. They are not “law,” or not necessarily “law.” The classical British view was 
that law and conventions are entirely distinct; “law” was by definition 
enforceable in court, whereas conventions were not. The more nuanced 
modern view in the Commonwealth is that although conventions may not be 
enforced in court, they may be “recognized” and used as an aid to interpreting 
statutes or deciding other legal questions. In our system, the “law” may or 
may not be enforceable in court, and although it is possible for legal 
rulemakers to adopt conventions as legal rules, they do not have to be so 
adopted, so conventions may or may not be enforced in court.24 
When will conventions be adopted as law? All else equal, courts are more 
likely to read conventions into open-ended or ambiguous texts with unclear 
originalist referents. As Justice Jackson urged, “Usage may sometimes impart 
changed content to constitutional generalities, such as ‘due process of law,’ ‘equal 
protection,’ or ‘commerce among the states.’”25 And of course Justice Frankfurter 
suggested that custom may provide a “gloss” on the executive power.26 
The articles by Patricia Bellia, on the one hand, and by Jack Goldsmith 
and John Manning, on the other, persuade me that the Faithful Execution 
Clause is fertile ground for such an approach.27 Consider a set of cases: (1) the 
Youngstown case,28 in which the President claimed inherent power to seize and 
operate steel mills necessary for war production; (2) In re Debs,29 which 
recognized inherent executive power to obtain an injunction against violent 
labor strikes; (3) Cunningham v. Neagle,30 which upheld the power of a United 
States Marshal to kill a man who posed an imminent threat to a Supreme 
Court Justice; and (4) Zivotofsky II,31 in which the Court found inherent 
presidential power to recognize foreign governments. The Court invalidated 
 
24 For the details, see generally Adrian Vermeule, Conventions in Court, 38 DUBLIN L.J. 283 (2015). 
25 Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 233 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
26 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). For an outstanding analytic taxonomy of gloss and its rationales, see Curtis A. 
Bradley, Doing Gloss, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
27 Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753 (2016); 
Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835 (2016). 
28 Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579. 
29 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
30 135 U.S. 1 (1890). 
31 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
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executive action in the first but sustained it in the other three.32 In the last, it 
went so far as to invalidate a contrary federal statute as an invasion of 
executive power that is not only inherent but exclusive.33 There is no obvious 
or even nonobvious set of legal distinctions that makes these cases line up 
together, although with enough work, one could doubtless construct some 
sort of theory. But the real engine of the decisions is a tacit appeal to a 
widespread conventional sense of the appropriate functions of government 
and the Executive in particular. Our confidence that the Executive must have 
the constitutional power to kill an assassin gunning for a Supreme Court 
Justice is pre-theoretical and persists undiminished even in the face of 
theoretical or legal uncertainty. It is a “can’t help” shared by almost everyone 
in the relevant community. More recently, and more explicitly, the Free 
Enterprise Fund decision shows the Court incorporating conventions of SEC 
independence into its treatment of the Faithful Execution Clause and other 
constitutional clauses bearing on executive power.34 
On the other side, conventions are not “politics” either. More accurately, 
they may or may not be a species of “politics,” depending on what we mean. 
The notion of “politics” is fatally ambiguous. It includes at least two critically 
different subcategories: ordinary contingent politics and moralized politics, 
 
32 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 (“Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several 
constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President.”); see also Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 
2094 (“[T]he power to recognize foreign states resides in the President alone . . . .”); Debs, 158 U.S. at 
599 (“[W]e hold . . . that in the exercise of those powers it is competent for the nation to remove all 
obstructions upon highways, natural or artificial, to the passage of interstate commerce or the carrying 
of the mail; that while it may be competent for the government (through the executive branch and in 
the use of the entire executive power of the nation) to forcibly remove all such obstructions, it is equally 
within its competency to appeal to the civil courts for an inquiry and determination as to the existence 
and character of any alleged obstructions, and if such are found to exist, or threaten to occur, to invoke 
the powers of those courts to remove or restrain such obstructions . . . .”); Neagle, 135 U.S. at 67, 75-76 
(“We cannot doubt the power of the President to take measures for the protection of a judge of one of 
the courts of the United States, who, while in the discharge of the duties of his office, is threatened 
with a personal attack which may probably result in his death . . . . [I]n the protection of the person 
and the life of Mr. Justice Field while in the discharge of his official duties, Neagle was authorized to 
resist the attack of Terry upon him; . . . that in taking the life of Terry, under the circumstances, he was 
acting under the authority of the law of the United States, and was justified in so doing; and that he is 
not liable to answer in the courts of California on account of his part in that transaction.”). 
33 See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (“To allow Congress to control the President’s 
communication in the context of a formal recognition determination is to allow Congress to exercise 
that exclusive power itself. As a result, the statute is unconstitutional.”). 
34 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496-97 (2010) (“This 
novel structure does not merely add to the Board’s independence, but transforms it. . . . Without the 
ability to oversee the Board, or to attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee, the 
President is no longer the judge of the Board’s conduct. He is not the one who decides whether Board 
members are abusing their offices or neglecting their duties. He can neither ensure that the laws are 
faithfully executed, nor be held responsible for a Board member’s breach of faith.”). 
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in which there are widely shared unwritten rules of the political game.35 Such 
rules are founded on a sense of obligation, and a public act violating the rules 
provokes retaliatory sanctions or moralized outrage.36 
Imagine the political reaction to two different proposals by a sitting 
President: (1) top marginal tax rates should go down, or (2) the stars and 
stripes on the U.S. flag should be replaced by an Apple logo, conditional on 
an enormous donation by Apple to the U.S. Treasury. Although both 
proposals would suffer objections from “public opinion,” the nature of the 
relevant “politics” would be very different. In the second case, even to make 
the proposal would violate a convention against the sale of public symbols, 
and would thus provoke outrage, not merely policy opposition. Semantically, 
we can say that conventions are a subspecies of politics, but at a minimum, 
conventions are a distinctive type of politics. I will reserve the label “politics” 
for contingent quotidian politics, as in the example of top marginal rates. 
B. Intragovernmental Versus Extragovernmental Conventions 
It follows that conventions may, but need not, be based upon the force of 
“public opinion.” Michael Gerhardt’s article usefully distinguishes publicly 
salient issues from low-visibility issues.37 Some conventions are indeed 
enforced by the threat of moralized outrage on the part of the diffuse mass of 
public opinion; let us call those extragovernmental conventions.38 Other 
conventions are enforced by the credible threat of retaliation from the other 
political party, another branch of the government, or some other institutional 
actor, even as to issues about which the general public is largely oblivious.39 
The usual case involves a tit-for-tat mechanism, like cooperation between 
government actors in an indefinitely iterated prisoners’ dilemma or assurance 
game.40 We might call those intragovernmental conventions. 
In a further distinction, intragovernmental conventions can be cross-party 
or intraparty. An example of the latter is the Hastert Rule. “[F]or some period 
of time starting in the 1990s, the Republican Party in the House of 
 
35 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1186-94 (describing these two categories). 
36 See id. (discussing the consequences of breaching either a “thin” or a “thick” obligation). 
37 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Arrogance, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1675 (2016) 
(“Public opinion matters most in presidential calculations on matters of great political salience, but 
that is only one factor that can influence Presidents.”). 
38 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1186 (noting “the threat of political backlash from the public, 
possibly resulting in an electoral defeat”). 
39 See id. at 1188 (using as examples senatorial courtesy over appointments, the filibuster rule, 
and pairing of absent senators in the United States and the “convention that incoming governments 
of a given party do not disclose to the public the confidential internal documents and memoranda 
of the other party” in the United Kingdom). 
40 See, e.g., id. at 1187-89 (discussing the applicability of the prisoners’ dilemma to these conventions). 
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Representatives, when it controlled the House, followed an internal 
convention called the ‘Hastert Rule,’” under which “no legislation would be 
approved unless a majority of the majority party voted in favor.”41 “The 
convention thus excluded approval by a majority comprising the minority 
party plus a minority of the majority party.”42 The rule has recently been more 
honored in the breach than in the observance.43 
Intragovernmental conventions are sociologically vulnerable. They tend 
to break down when, for external political and sociological reasons, new actors 
come on the scene who will not play by the preexisting rules. In the United 
Kingdom, a number of conventions suddenly broke down in the 1920s, in large 
part because of an influx into Parliament of members from new social classes, 
who were not in any long-term reciprocity relationship with the existing 
elites, or who rejected the existence of relevant conventions in the first place.44 
Our own version of this is the recent breakdown of cooperation between 
the Democratic and Republican parties over Senate norms, especially 
presidential appointments, particularly recess appointments, that Gerhardt 
referred to in his article.45 A large part of this story is the influx into the 
Republican Party of an insurgent element, opposed to the establishment 
element, which has no interest in long-run reciprocal cooperation with 
establishment Democrats.46 
When these Senate conventions break down, Presidents end up relying 
on increasingly aggressive claims of legal authority.47 This reliance is not just 
or not mainly a story of presidential aggrandizement, although it is partly 
that. It is also, counterintuitively, a symptom of presidential weakness. The 
breakdown of implicit conventions and understandings across parties and 
 
41 Vermeule, supra note 24, at 286. 
42 Id. 
43 See, e.g., House Votes Violating the “Hastert Rule,” N.Y. TIMES, http://politics.nytimes.com/
congress/votes/house/hastert-rule [https://perma.cc/AN7P-SF9W] (listing the “[v]otes that passed 
without the support of a majority of the majority party in the House”). 
44 See generally Richard Toye, ‘Perfectly Parliamentary’? The Labour Party and the House of 
Commons in the Inter-War Years, 24 TWENTIETH CENTURY BRIT. HIST. 1 (2014) (discussing the 
Labour Party of the 1920s). 
45 See Gerhardt, supra note 37, at 1658-61 (discussing developments in the practice of recess 
appointments). 
46 See Raf Sanchez, Tea Party Victory Dashes Barack Obama’s Lingering Hopes for Compromise with 
Republicans, TELEGRAPH (June 11, 2014, 7:42 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
republicans/10893084/Tea-Party-victory-dashes-Barack-Obamas-lingering-hopes-for-compromise-
with-Republicans.html [https://perma.cc/3QD7-EGV3] (reporting on the Tea Party’s electoral 
successes in the 2014 Republican Party primary elections and what it would mean for cooperation 
with the Democrats). 
47 See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 4-5 (2014) 
(highlighting the recent examples of recess appointments, changes to immigration enforcement, and 
the execution of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001). 
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across branches necessitates more formal or visible presidential aggression.48 
One immediate consequence is the possibility of tit-for-tat “self-defense” 
retaliation by institutions or parties, in various settings.49 
For another example of the consequences that result when conventions 
break down, let me quote from Nicholas Bagley’s article: 
 The Obama Administration’s willingness to bend the law [in the ACA 
financing controversy] is to some extent understandable. Congress’s refusal to 
meet the financial obligations that it assumed in prior legislation is a breach of 
a longstanding convention that Congress will appropriate the money to satisfy 
those obligations. . . . [The Administration’s] decision nonetheless sets a 
troubling precedent for future battles over the appropriations power. . . . It’s 
impossible to anticipate the full consequences of weakening the legislature’s 
power of the purse. . . .50 
Bagley’s sketch identifies not only the tit-for-tat structure of the 
Administration’s position, but also the long-run effects of retaliation on the 
informal precedents that structure executive–legislative relations. 
We might well imagine, after the controversy that Bagley identifies, that a 
new set of litigated cases over the scope and limits of legislative appropriations 
will arise. This highlights another consequence of the breakdown of 
conventions: law substitutes imperfectly for regulation-by-convention, as 
behavior that would have remained extrajudicial becomes legalized and 
litigated. The most obvious example is the recess appointments case, NLRB v. 
Noel Canning,51 which arose from the breakdown of tacit conventional 
constraints on the abuse of the filibuster for appointments and an aggressive 
tit-for-tat reaction from the presidency. I believe that Zivotofsky II52 is also an 
example of this effect. In an earlier era, conventions of interbranch comity 
would have prevented the full-bore constitutional showdown from producing a 
full merits decision by the Court. 
As both of these decisions show, a breakdown in conventions can end up 
increasing presidential power at the expense of Congress. Zivotofsky II, the 
first case to squarely invalidate a statute on exclusive executive power grounds 
 
48 See id. at 8 (“[M]any of the most pointed ways in which Congress and the President challenge 
one another can plausibly and profitably be modeled as self-help rather than self-aggrandizement, as efforts 
to enforce constitutional settlements rather than to circumvent them.” (emphasis added)). 
49 On the structure of such arguments, see generally N.W. Barber, Self-Defence for Institutions, 
72 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 558 (2013) and Pozen, supra note 47. 
50 Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1715, 1734-35 (2016). 
51 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).  
52 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
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under Category III of Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence,53 was one of the 
presidency’s greatest victories in court. Noel Canning invalidated the 
particular appointments at issue, but announced a constitutional framework 
that explicitly recognized a more expansive recess appointment power than 
the Administration’s opponents favored.54 In that sense Noel Canning was a 
victory for the presidency, if not for President Obama.55 In both cases, to the 
extent that the Administration’s opponents decided to breach conventions 
and take their chances in court out of a fear of excessive executive power, the 
long-run result was perverse and self-defeating. 
C. Conventions About Doing Things Versus Conventions About Saying Things 
Finally, let me turn to another distinction which I believe has been 
systematically overlooked in debates over executive enforcement discretion: the 
distinction between conventions about doing things, on the one hand, and 
conventions about saying things, on the other. Conventions about doing things, 
as discussed above, are obvious.56 However, there are also conventions regulating 
speech acts. There exists a category of executive discretion such that the 
Executive may do things without violating any law or convention, but will violate 
a convention, triggering political backlash or public outrage, if the Executive 
makes explicit that he or she is doing those things. Some things may be done, but 
may not be talked about. Making things explicit may be a separate violation. 
There is an analogy here to the Victorian Compromise, in which “vice” 
was tolerated so long as it was kept out of sight and not discussed.57 The 
Victorian Compromise was, in part, a convention—more accurately a network 
or structure of conventions—shaping the discretion of executive enforcers, 
such as police.58 Closer to our time, David Strauss’s fascinating unpublished 
 
53 See id. at 2084, 2096 (noting that “[b]ecause the President’s refusal to implement § 214(d) 
falls into Justice Jackson’s third category, his claim must be ‘scrutinized with caution,’ and he may 
rely solely on powers the Constitution grants to him alone,” and later declaring the statute 
unconstitutional); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”). 
54 See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577 (“We thus hold that the Constitution empowers the President 
to fill any existing vacancy during any recess—intra-session or inter-session—of sufficient length.”). 
55 See id. at 2557 (“[T]he Senate was in the midst of a 3-day recess. Three days is too short a 
time to bring a recess within the scope of the Clause. Thus we conclude that the President lacked 
the power to make the recess appointments here at issue.”). 
56 See supra Sections I.A–B. 
57 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1199 (defining “Victorian Compromise” as “in effect forcing 
those who would test their limits, or even violate them, to proceed on the quiet, so as not to trigger 
blaming, shaming, retaliation, electoral backlash, or other norm-enforcing sanctions”). 
58 See, e.g., Joshua C. Tate, Gambling, Commodity Speculation, and the “Victorian Compromise,” 19 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97, 98-99 (“So long as the general social fabric was preserved, it did not 
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paper, Do It But Don’t Tell Me,59 recounts a number of areas in which executive 
agents may do (so far as conventions are concerned) what they may not 
discuss; the obvious example is torture of suspected terrorists, which the 
American public is seemingly willing to tolerate so long as it is not done 
openly.60 Let me also offer, however, some less dramatic examples. 
Bagley’s article suggests the interesting hypothesis that tit-for-tat 
retaliation is subject to a convention against saying things.61 In other words, the 
President cannot openly cite tit-for-tat as a rationale, even if it is otherwise 
constitutionally legitimate, in a second-best sense, to engage in tit-for-tat 
behavior, necessitated by constitutional breaches by other actors. Bagley quite 
properly does not appear to be claiming that the hypothesis is actually true, 
only that it is sufficiently plausible to bear investigation.62 One would have to 
examine many cases more systematically to know whether it is in fact true. 
Nonetheless, it is a conceptually interesting possibility. 
Conventions against saying things regulate and prohibit avowed partisanship. 
There is no general norm against partisan behavior in the administrative state, 
nor could there be. Such behavior is everywhere. However, there is certainly a 
separate and independent norm against partisan justifications for partisan 
behavior. When the House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy openly admitted 
that the Benghazi investigation of Hillary Clinton was part of a Republican 
strategy to “fight and win,” he was widely excoriated by both parties and his 
bid for Speaker of the House was derailed.63 The resulting norm is complicated 
and conflicted. Ideally, we want officials to act based on nonpartisan reasons; 
non-ideally, we know that often they do not, and as a second best, we want them 
at least not to talk about it openly. If there is a rationale for that constraint, it 
is the “civilizing force of hypocrisy”:64 the inability to give openly partisan 
 
matter if vice continued to exist beneath the surface . . . . [T]he worst forms of vice were dealt with 
harshly, while less dangerous vices were allowed to go unpunished.”). 
59 David A. Strauss, Do It But Don’t Tell Me (Apr. 5, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
60 See id. at 12-16 (analyzing this example). 
61 See Bagley, supra note 50, at 1748-49 (“Politicians believe—with good reason—that the 
American public cares about the law and will punish a President who flouts it. Even if a limited 
right to self-help were to become a recognized, legitimate feature of the separation of powers, the 
President will likely hesitate before exercising that right, just as he hesitates before exercising his 
acknowledged right to veto a piece of legislation. Political repercussions thus offer a plausible 
mechanism for assuring that self-help stays within tolerable bounds.” (footnote omitted)). 
62 See id. at 1748-51 (acknowledging the arguments in favor of and against the presidential use 
of self-help and the potential for evidence to point in either direction). 
63 See E.J. Dionne Jr., Kevin McCarthy’s Truthful Gaffe on Benghazi, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kevin-mccarthys-truthful-gaffe/2015/09/30/f12a9fac-
67a8-11e5-8325-a42b5a459b1e_story.html [https://perma.cc/U8BP-RUYZ] (discussing this situation). 
64 See Publicity, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 12, 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/publicity/ [https://perma.cc/8RRL-AJQS] (citing to Jon Elster’s idea that “[t]he presence of 
a public makes it especially hard to appear motivated merely by self-interest” and that “[i]n general, 
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justifications in a transparent public setting may actually constrain behavior, at 
least at the edges, if there is no plausible public-spirited justification available 
as a pretext.65 Whether or not hypocrisy in fact acts as a civilizing force, 
however, it is unlikely that such a sophisticated rationale explains the genesis 
of the convention. Rather, the norm arises because people who will tolerate 
objectionable behavior if it is decorously concealed will become uncomfortable, 
and then outraged, if they are forced to confront it directly.66 
The idea of conventions against making things explicit may help us 
understand a range of current controversies over enforcement discretion. I 
refer to a category that includes the white-hot debate over immigration 
enforcement discretion, currently being litigated; the debate over presidential 
signing statements with no independent legal force, discussed in the article 
by Christopher Yoo;67 and Nick Bagley’s observation on the announced delay 
of the employer mandates under the Affordable Care Act (ACA): 
 If the Administration wished to deprioritize enforcement, it could have 
kept quiet about its plans. The regulated community would still have felt 
obliged to comply even if the likelihood of enforcement was low. For policy 
reasons, however, the Administration wanted to relieve employers and health 
plans of certain obligations. The Administration thus used the public 
announcements of its nonenforcement policies to encourage the regulated 
community to disregard provisions of the ACA.68 
These examples have a common structure. Imagine a set of executive 
enforcement decisions over an array of cases, A, B, and C. The enforcement 
decisions are made either (1) on a case-by-case basis, under an implicit or tacit 
policy; or (2) on an aggregate basis, under an explicit policy statement or set 
of enforcement guidelines. For clarity, let us hold all outcomes constant. We 
will assume, in other words, that A, B, and C are treated exactly the same way 
under both regimes. The same people are or are not deported, the same 
employers are or are not relieved of ACA obligations, and so on. I will put 
aside the objection, heard in many contexts, that approach (2) “makes law.” 
As a matter of administrative law, this is a red herring because there is nothing 
binding about the prospective announcement of how the Executive intends 
 
this civilizing force of hypocrisy is a desirable effect of publicity” (quoting JON ELSTER, Deliberation 
and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 97, 111 (1998))). 
65 See id. (“The public is meant to hold normative expectations regarding what representatives 
are supposed to say. One of these expectations is that any overt reference to mere self-interest in 
the course of justifying their position would be seen as unacceptable . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
66 Cf. Strauss, supra note 59, at 23-26 (arguing that this “moral ambivalence” may be an 
explanation for the “do it but don’t tell me” regime). 
67 Christopher S. Yoo, Presidential Signing Statements: A New Perspective, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
1801 (2016). 
68 Bagley, supra note 50, at 1723. 
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to exercise discretion in a class of cases. They are best understood as “general 
statements of policy” under section 553(b)(3)(A) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, and thus do not count as binding agency rules that must go 
through the process of notice and comment.69 Were the other party to take 
the presidency, all of these policies could be changed with a stroke of the pen. 
Given this structure, defenders of interpretive rules, of general policy 
statements in the immigration context, and so on argue that making 
enforcement guidelines explicit is better, from the standpoint of transparency, 
predictability, and the rule of law.70 Whether or not that view is ultimately 
correct, it must grapple with a major complication: making enforcement 
policy explicit may sometimes bump up against conventions that require 
keeping discretion subterranean. Relevant audiences will tolerate exercises of 
enforcement discretion that they are dimly aware are going on, but do not 
want that discretion to be made explicit and elevated to the level of a policy.71 
I do not claim that there is in fact such a convention in any one of the areas I 
have mentioned, let alone every one of them. I suggest only that it bears 
considering whether the strong reaction to, for example, the Obama 
Administration’s immigration enforcement policy statements cannot be 
explained solely by their content, but must also be explained with reference 
to the very fact that the Administration has made them explicit. A tacit 
pattern of enforcement behavior yielding all the same outcomes, across an 
array of cases, would be a very different matter. 
Once again, if such conventions against making things explicit do exist in 
a given area, it is a separate question whether their existence is good or bad 
from the standpoint of social welfare. It is also a complicated question. The 
principal effect of such conventions is to inhibit transparency, which has 
downsides as well as upsides; the relative costs and benefits of transparency 
are highly contextual and not susceptible to glib generalities.72 If the 
“civilizing force of hypocrisy” exists,73 then inhibiting transparency may have 
substantive effects in some cases, changing not only what may be said but 
what may be done. My suggestion is not normative, but analytic: the relevant 
debates over executive enforcement discretion and policy statements are 
incomplete, and may often be misguided, if participants fail to address the 
role of conventions. 
 
69 Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993). 
70 See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 
125 YALE L.J. 104, 174-75 (2015) (making this argument). 
71 See generally Strauss, supra note 59. 
72 For an attempt to consider all relevant costs and benefits under an array of conditions, see 
generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT 
SMALL (2007). 
73 Publicity, supra note 64. 
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CONCLUSION 
Legal analysts of executive power have to think about more than “law” 
and “politics”—using the latter term in a thin sense to refer to the shifting 
contingencies of partisan conflict over first-order policies. Conventions, 
unwritten rules of the political game, including conventions against saying 
things, shape and constrain executive discretion as well. To the extent that 
one believes, as I do, that law is less constraining on the Executive than many 
lawyers believe, conventions are relatively more important than would 
otherwise be the case. 
This is not to say that the importance of conventions is necessarily 
increasing over time. As we have seen, the increasing breakdown of 
intragovernmental conventions of reciprocal cooperation between the parties, 
and hence between the President and the Senate under conditions of divided 
government, has brought about the explicit legalization and juridification of a 
number of executive-power questions that were previously within the domain 
of convention. Yet, new conventions will eventually arise and stabilize, and in 
any event, there remains a robust set of conventions—surrounding removal, 
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